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VII. — *On the So-called Iterative Optative in Greek.*

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THE use of the optative mood, in Greek, in subordinate clauses (relative and conditional), referring to an indefinite number of acts or states in the past, has long been familiar to Hellenists as the 'optativus frequentiae,' 'optativus iterativus,' etc. The corresponding use of the subjunctive mood in relative clauses has likewise been recognized by many grammarians since, at least, the time of Gottfried Hermann.¹ But the distinction between sentences of particular and sentences of general or iterative reference was first applied to conditional periods having *ἐάν* (*ei*) and the subjunctive, as late as in the year 1846, by Bäumlein.² Having based this distinction, however, upon the general character which may be given to any class of conditions, Bäumlein failed to recognize its true significance and, accordingly, passed it over as of no importance.³ The honor of having first pointed out and emphasized the real nature and meaning of this distinction belongs to Professor Goodwin, who arrived at his results independently⁴ and, as is well known, the emphasis which Mr. Goodwin laid upon this distinction between 'particular' and 'general' suppositions formed one of the most striking features of his classification of conditional sentences, as presented in the first edition of his *Greek Moods and Tenses* (1860).

In the edition of 1865 the original arrangement was modified,⁵ but the same distinction was retained and was evidently a consideration of great importance in Mr. Goodwin's eyes, not only in his scheme of hypothetical sentences, but also in the development of his doctrine of the moods in Greek. This

¹ Hermann, *Ad Viger.*, p. 900; Buttmann, *Gr. Gram.*¹³, § 139 (Engl. trans.); Matthiae, *Gr. Gram.*, §§ 521, 523 (Engl. trans.); etc.

² *Untersuch. üb. d. gr. Modi* (1846), pp. 208, 221.

³ See *Trans. A.Ph.A.* 1873, p. 66; 1876, p. 106; *A.J.Ph.* III (1882), p. 436.

⁴ *A.J.Ph.* III (1882), p. 436, footnote.

⁵ See also *Trans. A.Ph.A.* 1873, p. 67, footnote.

last point is made apparent by the following remarks published in 1873: "The trouble begins when we attempt to define the use of the Greek Subjunctive. Here the whole difficulty—indeed, the whole supposed necessity for any definition at all except that of time—seems to me to arise from confounding two distinct uses of the subjunctive in protasis. . . . It seems to me that, when attention has once been called to the true position of the subjunctive in present general conditions, it will need no further argument to show that its essential character in all other cases of protasis is its designation of future time."¹ And again: "When the optative in past general conditions is excluded, it is evident that the optative in ordinary protasis refers to the future."²

In the article from which these passages are quoted, no explanation was offered for this summary exclusion of the subjunctive and the optative in these constructions. But in the revised edition of the *Moods and Tenses* (1889) the exclusion of the optative is justified by the consideration that, "Here the optative after a past tense represents an original subjunctive after a present tense, . . . The late development of the optative appears from its almost total absence in protasis with *εἰ* in Homer, . . . It may, therefore, be disregarded in considering the primitive uses of the optative."³ The exclusion of the subjunctive is similarly justified by the late development of this construction in Homer, "except in relative clauses."⁴ As we shall see later, these constructions, thus summarily dismissed, have never been (and probably never could be) adequately explained by Mr. Goodwin's theory of these moods. Paradoxical as it may seem, the very constructions the recognition of which was an important step in the development of his doctrine of the moods remained thereafter virtually ignored by that doctrine.

With this point, however, we are not primarily concerned. The leading purpose of this paper is to examine the validity of Mr. Goodwin's assumption that "the optative in past

¹ *Trans. A.Ph.A.* 1873, p. 65 ff.; see also *M.T.*² (1865), p. iv.

² *Trans. A.Ph.A.* 1873, p. 69.

³ § 17; cf. §§ 176, 463, 532 and App. I, p. 389.

⁴ *Ibid.*, § 11, b.

general suppositions only represents the corresponding subjunctive transferred to the past.”¹

This theory, suggested apparently by Kühner's classification, seems to have gained, at least among American and English scholars, a wide acceptance.²

Very similar is the explanation of Brugmann who, as usual, attempts to trace the construction historically. A Greek construction in origin, the iterative optative, he remarks, is most closely related to the optative of *oratio obliqua*, for both these constructions developed from the potential optative. After showing how the optative came to be used to represent an original subjunctive in such a sentence as ἐβουλεύοντο ὅπη

¹ *Ibid.*, p. 389. The majority of previous scholars had been content to explain the use of the optative in generic sentences in accordance with preconceived doctrines regarding the fundamental meaning of the mood. Thus Hermann writes: “hic modus, quoniam ad cogitata tantum refertur, ibi, ubi de pluribus factis sermo est, non certum aliquod factum designat, sed quodcumque ex illis pluribus intelligere quis velit” (*Ad Viger.*, p. 907). Bernhardt, according to whom the optative is the mood of “pure possibility,” remarks that “der Modus ein öfteres Vorkommen und Wiederholen andeutet, weil in ihm eine Reihe möglicher That-sachen enthalten ist” (*Wiss. Syn. d. gr. Spr.* (1829), § 405). For similar views, see Buttmann, *Gr. Gram.*¹⁸ (1829), § 139, anm. 6; Matthiae (trans.), §§ 521, 523, 524; etc. Seeking to improve on Hermann's explanation, Bäumlein includes this use of the mood among those where the optative expresses a purely imaginary, abstract idea. For in these sentences of general application a class of actions or states is designated which, he says, the Greek language treats as something merely conceived and subjective (*Untersuch. üb. d. gr. Modi* (1846), p. 285 f.). The classification adopted by Kühner was new and suggestive. Having boldly declared the subjunctive and the optative to be primary and secondary tense-forms of a single mood — “der Modus der mittelbaren Erkenntniss oder der Vorstellung” — he was led to associate closely the subjunctive and the optative in generic relative sentences, as illustrating a sequence of tenses (moods) in Greek, analogous to that in Latin (*Ausf. Gram. d. gr. Spr.* (1835), § 465, 1, and see §§ 807, 3; 809, 2, 6). Thus, though he seems not to have included conditional clauses expressed by ἐάν (εἰ) and the subjunctive, he was perhaps the first to emphasize the parallelism between the subjunctive and the optative in these classes of subordinate sentences denoting indefinite frequency. This feature of Kühner's classification seems to have been not without influence upon the development of Mr. Goodwin's theory, although his main thesis was rejected by many scholars, including even Mr. Goodwin himself.

² Bayfield, “Cond. Sent. in Greek and Latin,” *Class. Rev.* IV ('90), p. 200; Donovan, “Prosp. Subj. and Optative,” *Class. Rev.* VIII ('94), p. 145; Sonnenschein, *Gr. Gram.* § 504; Keep, *Essential Uses of the Moods in Greek and Latin*, § 26; etc.

φύγοιεν (φύγωσιν) ("es geschah also eine Modusverschiebung"), he says: "Den iterativen optativ aber versteht man, sobald man sich erinnert, dass unter denselben Verhältnissen nach einem Haupttempus ὅτε, ὁπότε, εἰ, mit dem Konjunctiv üblich war, z. B., I 647, δ 400, Soph. Phil. 111." The optative once established as the representative of the subjunctive in *oratio obliqua*, it was but a step to employ the optative as the representative also of the indicative. "Ein Satz wie εἶροντο, τίς εἴη καὶ πόθεν ἔλθοι war ursprünglich: 'sie fragten wer mag er sein und woher mag er gekommen sein?' Nach Massgabe von Sätzen nun wie ἐβουλεύοντο ὅπη φύγοιεν und ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους παύεσκον μνηστῆρας, ὅτις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέζοι (χ 315), konnte dies leicht umgedeutet werden in: 'sie fragten, wer er wäre und woher er gekommen wäre.' Hieran schloss sich das Übrige an."¹ Thus, according to Brugmann, the iterative optative, closely allied to the optative of *oratio obliqua*, is the representative, as his words seem to imply, after a secondary tense of the subjunctive after a primary tense in general conditional (relative) periods. This last point was not so clearly suggested in the second edition of his grammar (1889),² but as now set forth Brugmann's view seems not essentially different from that advocated by Mr. Goodwin.³

But this explanation of the optative in these clauses, as the representative of the subjunctive, has not passed unchallenged. It is rejected by Lange,⁴ whose doctrine of the optative as the mood of the imagination (*Einbildungskraft*, p. 38) easily accounts for this use of the mood, and who, moreover, systematically opposes the assumption of a shifting of mood. It is attacked also by Professor I. Flagg with the follow-

¹ *Gr. Gram.*³ (1899), § 562.

² In the second edition the corresponding clauses with the subjunctive are not mentioned in this connection, but the author states, respecting the iterative optative: "Ausgegangen wer dieser Gebrauch von Sätzen wie χ 315" (quoted above), § 167.

³ But see below, p. 25.

⁴ *Der homer. Gebrauch d. Partikel ei* (1872), p. 140 f., and see pp. 66, 87, 89. Lange seems to have Kühner in mind, although he does not say so; cf. p. 88. Delbrück (*Conj. u. Opt.* p. 223 ff., 236) only mentions the iterative optative to warn against ascribing the idea of repetition to the optative itself.

ing cogent argument : " A strict division of subordinate clauses shows that pure conditions, as might be expected, belong to a class in which the use of the optative does not specifically result from the principal clause being past in time. Otherwise, we ought to find the subjunctive also, as we never do find it, side by side with the optative in a pure condition, when the time of the conclusion is past, exactly as either mode is found after a past tense, in final clauses for example." ¹ Finally, we may note that the view expressed by Professor Gildersleeve, in an article published in 1876, that " the so-called optative of indefinite frequency is nothing but the *oratio obliqua* of the subjunctive," ² seems later to have given way to the view that the past generic condition is an ideal, not an oblique anticipatory, condition : " As in the anticipatory, so in the ideal, condition we have the classification into particular and generic." ³

As already stated, it is the purpose of this paper to examine the validity of the theory that the iterative optative is the representative, by a change of mood, of an original subjunctive. To this end the writer has made a study of the usage of the optative and the subjunctive, not only in general conditional periods, but, for the sake of comparison and adequate perspective, in all logically antecedent conditional and conditional relative clauses in Homer. After presenting the results of this investigation, we shall pass to the interpretation of the facts previously set forth and the discussion of the bearing of these facts upon the theory in question.

I.⁴

The difficulty of determining with exactness the degree of grammatical parataxis or hypotaxis in many expressions,

¹ *Outlines of the Temporal and Modal Principles of Attic Prose* (publ. by Univ. of Cal., Berkeley), 1893, p. ix.

² " On *εἰ* with the Future Indicative," etc., *Trans. A.Ph.A.* (1876), p. 8.

³ " Studies in Pindaric Syntax," *A.J.Ph.* III (1882), p. 437.

⁴ The enumeration is based upon the text of Ameis-Hentze, carefully compared with La Roche, *Homeri Ilias*, 1873, and Ludwich, *Homeri Odyssea*, 1889. For other editions and works consulted, see the footnotes.

interpretable either as wishes or as conditions, renders impossible a certain and final enumeration of all strictly conditional clauses in Homer. This is well shown by the varying treatment of individual cases by different scholars.¹ From the following list those clearly containing a wish are omitted, as B 371. The sentences here included are divided, first with respect to the form of the apodosis, second with respect to the introductory word of the protasis.

I. APODOSIS — OPTATIVE.

A. Optative with $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)$ ($\acute{\alpha}\nu$).

1. Protasis introduced by $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ ($\alpha\acute{\iota}$), $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \kappa\epsilon(\nu)$, etc.

a. Protasis prepositive — 49 cases (*Il.* 25; *Od.* 24).

(a) $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ ($\alpha\acute{\iota}$). Δ 34; Z 284; H 129; I 379 (385), 515; N 276 ($\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho$. . . but clearly not a wish); Ξ 208; Π 746; P 102; Ψ 274 (contr. to reality); Ω 366, 653; α 163; γ 115, 223 (clearly conditional); ϵ 206; λ 356, 501 (cond.); π 105; ρ 223, 407; σ 223, 246, 254 = τ 127; ν 42, 49; χ 61.

The following are interpretable as wishes or as conditions:

M 322 $\acute{\omega}\ \pi\acute{\epsilon}\pi\omicron\nu, \epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \pi\acute{o}\lambda\epsilon\mu\omicron\nu\ \pi\epsilon\rho\acute{\iota}\ \tau\acute{o}\nu\delta\epsilon\ \phi\upsilon\gamma\acute{o}\nu\tau\epsilon$
 $\alpha\acute{\iota}\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \delta\eta\ \mu\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omicron\iota\mu\epsilon\nu\ \acute{\alpha}\gamma\acute{\eta}\rho\omega\ \tau\acute{\iota}\ \acute{\alpha}\theta\alpha\nu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega\ \tau\epsilon$
 $\xi\sigma\sigma\epsilon\sigma\theta', \omicron\upsilon\tau\epsilon\ \kappa\epsilon\nu\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\acute{o}\varsigma\ \acute{\epsilon}\nu\acute{\iota}\ \pi\rho\acute{\omega}\tau\omicron\iota\varsigma\ \mu\alpha\chi\acute{o}\iota\mu\eta\nu.$

So La Roche, Lange, Monro, Leaf; Ameis-Hentze read $\xi\sigma\sigma\epsilon\sigma\theta'$ and interpret it as a wish. So also Delbrück, *S.F.* I, S. 241. π 148 (interpreted as a condition by Ludwig, Lange, etc., as a wish by Am.-H. and Delbrück). O 49 (condition, La Roche, Monro, Leaf; wish, Delbrück, Lange, Am.-H.). Π 623; P 156, 160; ρ 313; σ 384. Add also σ 376.²

(β) $\epsilon\acute{\iota}$ ($\alpha\acute{\iota}$) $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)$.³ β 76; τ 589; ν 389; $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \delta\acute{\epsilon}\ \kappa\epsilon\nu$ I 141 = 283; $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \kappa\alpha\acute{\iota}\ \nu\acute{\upsilon}\ \kappa\epsilon\nu$ Ψ 592; $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \tau\acute{o}\upsilon\tau\omega\ \kappa\epsilon$ E 273; Θ 196; $\epsilon\acute{\iota}\ \pi\epsilon\rho\ \gamma\acute{\alpha}\rho\ \kappa\epsilon$ B 123; Θ 205; N 288; β 246.

¹ Compare the discussions of Lange, *Partikel ei*, p. 346 ff., with those of Hentze, *Die Parataxis bei Homer*, *Progr. Abhandl.*, Göttingen (1888, 1889, 1891), Th. II, 1889, and see Delbrück, *S.F.* I, p. 236 ff.

² See Hentze, *Parataxis bei Homer*, Th. II, p. 17.

³ For $\kappa\epsilon(\nu)$ in these clauses, see *G.M.T.*, §§ 460 f. and Brugmann, *Gr. Gram.*³ § 560 d.

b. Protasis postpositive — 31 cases (*Il.* 12; *Od.* 19).

(a) εἰ (αι'). A 255; Δ 347; Θ 21; Λ 134; Ξ 333; Π 71, 747; P 398 (unreal); X 20; β 62, 250 (text doubtful, but εἰ with optative fairly certain); γ 227; δ 224, 225; ε 177; θ 216; ι 277; κ 342; μ 77, 88 (rejected by Aristarchus); ν 291; ο 435; σ 357; υ 326; φ 195; χ 13, 62. In P 488 the indicative ἐθέλεις is well supported and is to be preferred.

(β) εἴ (αι') κε(ν). Z 49; I 444; K 380; θ 352.

2. Protasis introduced by ὅς (τις).

a. Prepositive — δ 222.

b. Postpositive — 26 cases (*Il.* 10; *Od.* 16).

(a) ὅς (τις). Δ 539 (unreal); Z 329, 521; I 125 = 267; M 228; N 118, 321, 343 (unreal); Ξ 91; α 229; β 336; δ 205; θ 239; κ 383; λ 489; ν 291; ξ 404; ο 317 (text doubtful, but optative certain); π 386; χ 138; ψ 100 = 168.

(β) ὅς κε. β 54 (*v.l.* subj.); π 391 = φ 161.

3. Protasis introduced by ὅτε.

a. Prepos.¹ Θ 23. b. Postpos. 8 (*Il.* 1; *Od.* 7): β 31; ε 188; λ 375; μ 112; ν 389. Ξ 247 (ὅτε μὴ),² so π 196; ψ 184.

4. Protasis introduced by ἐπεὶ (ἐπὶν).

ἐπεὶ ἄν I 304; ἐπὶν T 208. In the last the opt. *τισαίμεθα* is said by some (*e.g.* Am.-H., Monro) to be due to the mood of ἀνώγοιμι; others rightly dissent. But see below page 120, note 1.

5. ὅσος, λ 360.

B. Pure Optative (wish, concession, etc.).

1. εἰ (αι').

Prepos. Δ 17. Postpos. E 214; π 102; η 314 (οἶκον δέ τ' ἐγὼ . . . δόην, *v.l.* οἶκον δέ κ'); T 321.

2. ὅς(τις).

Prepos. Ω 139 (τῇδ' εἴη· ὅς ἄποινα φέροι, κτλ. But see Monro).

Postpos. Z 57; α 47; ο 359; σ 142.

¹ For the discussion of Γ 221, see page 11.

² For these sentences, see Lange, *Partikel εἰ*, p. 465, and Leaf's note on N 319.

3. ὅτε and ὁππότε.

Postpos. Σ 464; Φ 429; μ 106; σ 146.

4. ἐπὶν Ω 226.

5. ὁππότερος Γ 299.

One anomalous passage remains for special consideration. This is ε 483 :

. . . φύλλων γὰρ ἔην χύσις ἤλιθα πολλή,
ὅσσον τ' ἦε δύω ἦε τρεῖς ἄνδρας ἔρυσθαι
ὦρῃ χειμερίῃ, εἰ καὶ μάλα περ χαλεπαῖνοι.¹

The optative in this sentence is incorrectly classed by Goecke with that of Ω 768 as an optative of indefinite frequency in past time.² Less incorrect is the interpretation of Lange.³ Because of similarity of form in the concessive clause, Lange cites together this passage and θ 138 :

οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ γέ τί φημι κακώτερον ἄλλο θαλάσσης,
ἄνδρα γε συγγεῖναι, εἰ καὶ μάλα καρτερός εἴη,

and θ 215 (πρῶτός κ' ἄνδρα βάλοιμι . . . , εἰ καὶ μάλα πολλοὶ ἐταῖροι | ἄγχι παρασταῖεν κ.τ.λ.). After noting that the optative in all three examples is concessive, and, farther, that if the second and the third passages seem to contain the opt. de iter. actione, this arises simply from the fact "dass die gesetzte Handlung der Natur der Sache nach oft vorkommen kann," he continues: "Uebrigens bezieht sich der εἰ-Satz in zweiten Beispiele, θ 138, nicht auf den Begriff des im Praesens stehenden Verbuns, sondern auf den des Infinitivs συγγεῖναι, dessen Zeitsphäre aber natürlich durch φημί bestimmt ist. . . . Im erstern Beispiele geht im Hauptsatz ein Tempus der Vergangenheit vorher, aber der εἰ-Satz bezieht sich nicht auf ἔην, sondern auf das in dem mit ὅσσον beginnenden Satze hinzuzudenkende ἐστίν. Wenn man diess berücksichtigt, so entsteht auch in diesem Beispiele der Schein des Opt. de iter. actione, und zwar auf dieselbe Weise, wie in den andern." A brief consideration will suffice to show

¹ Some Mss. read χαλεπαίνει.

² "Der Gebrauch des Konjunktivs u. Opt. bei Homer," *Progr. zu Malmedy*, 1881, p. xix. This is a carelessly assorted collection of Homeric usage, and abounds in typographical errors.

³ *Partikel εἰ*, p. 470 f.

that this explanation is inadequate. For it must be clear that *εἰ* . . . *χαλεπαίνου* does not refer to an *ἐστίν* to be supplied (only possible in the order *ἔστιν ὅσσον, κ.τ.λ.*), but only to *ὅσσον* . . . *ἔρυσθαι*, and that without regard to any verb-form which might conceivably be supplied to introduce the clause *ὅσσον κ.τ.λ.* For, whereas in *θ* 138 (which is equivalent to *κάκιστον θάλασσα ἄνδρα συγχεῦαι*) *κάκιστον συγχεῦαι* is a statement of an universal truth, and readily admits of being resolved into *κακῶς συγχέει*; in *ε* 483, on the contrary, *ὅσσον ἔρυσθαι* is *νοί* a statement of an universal truth, but can only be resolved into *ὅσσον κε* . . . *ἐρύοιτο*, or the like, while *εἰ* . . . *χαλεπαίνου* refers to a merely conceived case. Clearly, therefore, this sentence, though of irregular form, may more properly be classed with conditional periods whose apodoses contain a potential optative than with those that have a verb of present tense in the apodosis.

II. APODOSIS — IMPERATIVE OR SUBJUNCTIVE OF EXHORTATION.

δ 600 *δῶρον δ' ὅττι κέ μοι δοίης, κειμήλιον ἔστω*. "The optative avoids assuming that the case will ever occur" (Monro), *Ψ* 893 *ἀτὰρ δόρυ . . . πόρωμεν, εἰ σύ γε σῶ θυμῷ ἐθέλοις*.¹

III. APODOSIS — FUTURE INDICATIVE OR EQUIVALENT.

A. Future Indicative.

1. *εἰ*. (α) Prepositive. *K* 222; *T* 100; *ρ* 539; *μ* 345 (*εἴ κε*); *X* 351. (β) Postpositive. *A* 59 (see Lange, *Partikel εἰ*, p. 512); *I* 388 and probably *B* 597 (Lange, p. 514).

2. *ὅς(τις)*. *τ* 510; *K* 307 (*ὅς τις κε*). 3. *ὅτε μή*. *N* 319 (see Leaf's note).

B. Subjunctive.

1. *εἰ*. *A* 386 (by some interpreted as a wish, as also *K* 222 above); so also *δ* 388 (*ὅς κε, Ω. Hesych. ὥς κε*); *B* 488 (Lange, pp. 464, 478); *Ψ* 344.²

¹ So Delbrück, Lange, Am.-H., Leaf, etc., following the reading of *AGHL*. Many good Mss. read *ἐθέλεις*, so La Roche, Monro, etc. But see Lange, p. 443.

² All Mss. read *παρέλθου* (La Roche). But see Lange's note, p. 516 f., in which, however, *δ* 367 is a misprint for *δ* 596(?).

2. ὅτε. Γ 54 (see Leaf's note); β 43 ἀγγελίην . . . ἦν χ' ὑμῖν σάφα εἶπω, ὅτε πρότερός γε πυθοίμην, κτλ.¹

C. Present Indicative referring by Anticipation to the Future.

X 219 (οὐδ' εἴ κεν); Z 452 (ὅς κε).

IV. APODOSIS — PRESENT INDICATIVE, NOT REFERRING TO FUTURE.²

1. εἰ. I 318 ἴση μοῖρα μένοντι καὶ εἰ μάλα τις πολεμίζοι (v.l. πολεμίζῃ, πολεμίζει); α 414 (ἔλθοι); η 52; θ 139; ξ 56 (ἔλθοι, v.l. ἔλθῃ).

2. ὅς(τις). Ψ 494; ζ 286. In P 631 read ἀφήῃ (La Roche), but see Delbrück, S.F. I, 226, and Am.-H., *Anhang*.

3. Temporal conjunctions. ω 253, τοιούτῳ δὲ ἔοικας (Voss, ἔοικεν), ἐπεὶ λούσαιο . . . | εὐδέμεναι μαλακῶς, κτλ.; ω 343, διατρύγιος δὲ ἕκαστος | ἦν· ἔνθα δ' ἀνὰ σταφυλαὶ παντοῖαι ἔασιν, ὁππότε δὴ Διὸς ὦραι ἐπιβρίσειαν ὑπερθεῖν. (So most editors; Am.-H. consider ἔνθα . . . ἔασιν parenthetical, see Monro, H.G. § 308.) Λ 543 lacks manuscript support.

V. APODOSIS — INDICATIVE, SECONDARY TENSE.³

These are passages containing the so-called Optativus Iterativus.

1. εἰ. Ω 768.

2. ὅς(τις). (α) Prepositive — B 188, 198; Δ 232, 240; K 489; O 22, 743; ι 94.

(β) Postpositive — B 215; M 267; O 730; Φ 610 (σαώσαι, so Arist.); ξ 220; ρ 316, 420 = τ 76; χ 315, 414 = ψ 65.⁴

¹ The subjunctive with κε is employed (cf. l. 31) "um seine Bereitwilligkeit recht energisch auszudrücken" (Am.-H.). Nauck, cj. εἵπομι for σάφα εἶπω. See also Monro, H.G., p. 258.

² See below, page 124; see also Lange, *Partikel ei*, p. 446 ff.

³ Imperfect or the Ionic Iteratives in -σκε/ο, unless otherwise stated.

⁴ In μ 330

καὶ δὴ ἄγρην ἐφέπεσκον ἀλγτεύοντες ἀνάγκη,
ἰχθὺς ὀρνιθὲς τε, φίλας ὅτι χεῖρας ἵκοιτο, κ.τ.λ.

the clause φίλας . . . ἵκοιτο appears to be logically subsecutive. Ameis-Hentze, however, comment "ὅτι . . . ἵκοιτο, iterativ in Bezug auf ἐφέπεσκον: was jedesmal kam." Delbrück's interpretation is similar (S.F. I, p. 226). But in this case we must translate 'When they went in quest of game, *catching* (i.e. *trying to catch*) fishes and birds, whatever,' etc.

3. Temporal conjunctions. *a. ὅτε.* (*a*) Prepositive — 17 cases (*Il.* 9; *Od.* 8). Γ 216; K 11, 14; P 732 (apod. *τράπετο*); T 226, 228; X 502; θ 87, 90; ι 208; λ 510, 513, 596; μ 237, 240.

There belong here also

I 524 οὕτω καὶ τῶν πρόσθεν ἐπενθόμεθα κλέα ἀνδρῶν
 ἡρώων, ὅτε κέν¹ τιν' ἐπιζάφελος χόλος ἴκοι.
 δωρητοί τε πέλοντο παρρηγοί τ' ἐπέεσσιν,

and Γ 221² (216–224)

ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ πολύμητις ἀναΐξειεν Ὀδυσσεύς,
 στάσκειν, ὑπαὶ δὲ ἴδεσκε κατὰ χ'ονὸς ὄμματα πῆζας,
 σκήπτρον δ' οὐτ' ὀπίσω οὔτε προπρηγνὲς ἐνώμα,
 ἀλλ' ἄστεμφές ἔχεσκειν, αἰδρεῖ φωτὶ ἐοικώς.
 220 φαίης κε ζάκοτόν τέ τιν' ἐμμεναι ἄφρονά τ' αὐτῶς.
 ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ ὅπα τε μεγάλην ἐκ στήθεος εἴη³
 καὶ ἔπεα νιφάδεσσιν ἐοικότα χειμερίησιν,
 οὐκ ἂν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσσῆϊ γ' ἐρίσσειε βροτὸς ἄλλος.
 224 οὐ τότε γ' ὦδ' Ὀδυσῆος ἀγασσάμεθ' εἶδος ἰδόντες.

That the clause *ὅτε δὴ ὅπα . . . εἴη* is the protasis of a so-called past general (relative) condition cannot be questioned; for, as in all past general conditions (*e.g.* that in Γ 216), reference is distinctly made to a repeated past event. Accordingly, the apodosis cannot be found in *οὐκ ἂν . . . ἐρίσσειε* (223); for then we should have a contrary-to-fact condition, an interpretation which the context clearly makes impossible. And, moreover, the protasis of *οὐκ ἂν . . . ἐρίσσειε* can only be 'if he had tried,' or 'had desired,' or the like. The real apodosis of *ὅτε . . . εἴη* is furnished by the words of the often, but unnecessarily and indeed incorrectly, rejected line 224. Those scholars who (*e.g.* Bentley, Heyne, Payne-Knight, Bekker, Köchly, etc.) pronounce line 224 spurious perhaps fail to observe that, as in lines 216–220, there occurs a general condition (*ὅτε . . . ἀναΐξειεν . . . στάσκειν*) followed by a detached potential optative referring to the past, *φαίης κε*;

¹ The only instance of *ὅτε κεν* in these clauses, or indeed elsewhere, in Homer. See *Monro, H.G.*, p. 283; *Delbrück, S.F. I.*, p. 236.

² Not mentioned by *Delbrück, Syn. Forsch. I.*

³ So best Mss., *v.l.* *ἔει*.

so in lines 221-224 the same elements occur, though in a different order, the general period being broken by the intercalated past potential for the sake of emphasis. This becomes clear if we reverse the order of the lines 223 and 224, just as we might have had above *ὅτε . . . ἀναΐξειεν· φαίης κε, κ.τ.λ.· στάσκειν* [γάρ] . . .¹ Accordingly, the sense of the passage is: 'But whenever he spoke, then we ceased to wonder thus² at his appearance; after that no other mortal could have vied with Odysseus.'

(β) Postpositive — 13 cases (*Iliad* 6; *Odyssey* 7). A 610; K 78; P 463; Σ 566; T 132; δ 190; η 138; θ 219; π 140; σ 7; τ 49 (= A 610). 370; also I 486 (*οὐκ ἐθέλεσκες . . . , πρὶν γ' ὅτε δὴ . . . ἄσαιμι*).³

b. *ὁπότε*. (α) Prepositive. Σ 544; λ 591; ξ 217.

(β) Postpositive — 6 cases (*Iliad* 4; *Odyssey* 2).

Γ 232 (Apod. *πολλάκις . . . ξείνισσεν*); N 710; O 283; T 315 (Apod. *ποτέ* ("nearly = 'many a time,'" Monro) . . . *ἔθηκας*); γ 282; μ 380.

c. *ἐπεὶ*. (α) Prepositive. Ω 14; Θ 269 (*ἐπεὶ . . . βεβλήκει* (Arist.) or *βεβλήκει* (Mss.)) is doubtful.⁴

(β) Postpositive. β 105; τ 150; ω 140.

d. *ὁσσάκι*. Postpositive. Φ 265; X 194; λ 585.

4. Protasis introduced by other conjunctions (all postpositive).

ὁποῖος, ρ 420 = τ 76.

ὅθι, Δ 516 (*ᾧρσε . . . ἐρχομένη . . . ὅθι . . . ἴδοιτο*).

ὅπη, γ 106 (*ἀνέτλημεν . . . πλαζόμενοι . . . ὅπη ἄρξειεν*).

ὅπως, Σ 470.

¹ The bold suggestion of Giske (Ebeling, *Hom. I.ex.* s.v. *ἀγαμαι*) that line 224 be placed immediately after 220 does not serve to elucidate or to remedy the irregularities of this difficult passage.

² *ᾧδε* with reference to 220, not to 223 (Ameis-Hentze), nor yet to *εἶδος ἰδόντες*, as though it were *τοιούτων* (Bayfield). For the broken conditional period, cf. I 524 (quoted above); for *ὅτε . . . τότε* in a past general condition, cf. λ 596; for the aorist in the apodosis of such a condition, here made more natural by the irregular order of the clauses, cf. P 732, Φ 610, Γ 232, T 315. The neglect of the digamma does not prove line 224 spurious.

³ For *πρὶν* in such sentences see Monro, *H.G.*, § 297, also § 308 d, and *G.M.T.*, §§ 645, 646; 613, 5.

⁴ See Monro, *H.G.*, § 83, 3.

There remain to be mentioned a few miscellaneous passages, in which the optative may represent a subjunctive after a primary tense, or may, indeed, be original, but which in post-Homeric Greek would regularly be explained as resulting from a change of mood. These are as follows :

θ 70 πὰρ δ' ἐτίθει κάνεον καλήν τε τράπεζαν,
πὰρ δὲ δέπας οἴνοιο πιεῖν, ὅτε θυμὸς ἀνώγοι,

in which "der Opt. bezeichnet die Vorstellung des Heroldes" (Am.-H.). So, if genuine, Θ 189. In Δ 263 read ἀνώγη (see Monro, *H.G.*, § 308, 1).

ξ 521 [χλαῖναν] ἣ οἱ παρεκέσκει' ἀμοιβάς,
ἐννυσθαι, ὅτε τις χειμὼν ἔκπαγλος ὄροιο.

Υ 147 [τεῖχος] ποίειον, ὄφρα τὸ κῆτος ὑπεκπροφυγῶν ἀλείαιτο,
ὅππότε μιν σεύαιτο ἀπ' ἡϊόνος πεδίονδε.

Similar are ν 22 ; ι 333.

Ψ 748 καὶ τὸν Ἀχιλλεὺς βῆκεν ἀέθλιον οὐ ἐτάροιο,
ὅς τις ἐλαφρότατος ποσσὶ κραιπνοῖσι πέλοιτο.

Similar is Σ 507, and

λ 288 οὐδ' ἄρα Νηλεὺς
τῷ ἐδ'δου, ὃς μὴ ἔλικας βόας εὐρυμετώπους
ἐκ Φυλᾶκης ἐλάσειε βίης Ἴφικληΐης, | ἀργαλέας.

This passage is incorrectly interpreted by Hayman as a negative past general condition : "The case of one's not driving the cattle was a case of Neleus' not giving, which seems to show that there is nothing properly frequentative in the optative itself."¹ No, not here, certainly ; seeing that Melampus was the only man that ever made the attempt (τὰς δ' οἶος ὑπέσχετο μάντις ἀμύμων | ἐξελάαν, λ 291).

ω 173. ὁμοκλέομεν . . . τόξον μὴ δόμεναι, μηδ' εἰ . . . ἀγορεύοι
Ε 301, δόρν . . . ἔσχε . . . | τὸν κτάμεναι μεμαώς, ὃς τις . . . ἔλθοι.
So P 8 and, finally, the difficult and isolated passage H 387,
ἠνώγει Πρίαμος . . . | εἰπέμεν, αἶ κέ περ ὕμμι φίλον καὶ ἡδὺ
γένοιτο, | μῦθον Ἀλεξάνδροιο, κ.τ.λ., where the optative in
the clause αἶ κε . . . γένοιτο, probably a courteous formula, is
due to the past tense, ἠνώγει (Monro).

¹ *Odyssey*, I, App. A, 9 (20), p. xxiii.

Quite anomalous is Γ 453

οὐ μὲν γὰρ φιλότῃ γ' ἐκεύθανον, εἴ τις ἴδοιτο.

Of the various well-known interpretations of this familiar passage that suggested by Lange (*Partikel εἰ*, p. 400) that οὐκ ἐκεύθανον involves the thought ἐμελλον δεῖξαι, with which is combined the wish 'if I could but see him!', is perhaps the most satisfactory. Other interpretations are based upon the supposition that the construction is elliptical. The condition is certainly not general, although so interpreted by Ameis.

The following table (I) is a summary of the facts thus far presented. For purposes of comparison, the Homeric usage of the subjunctive in conditional and conditional relative sentences is exhibited in a second table.

I.

OPTATIVE IN CONDITIONAL (RELATIVE) SENTENCES IN HOMER.

Protasis introduced by	Apodosis Optative.		Apodosis Future Indic. or equivalent. ¹		Apodosis Imperative.		Apodosis Pres. Indic.		Apodosis Secondary Tense Indic.		Totals.
	Pre-pos.	Post-pos.	Pre-pos.	Post-pos.	Pre-pos.	Post-pos.	Pre-pos.	Post-pos.	Pre-pos.	Post-pos.	
<i>εἰ (αἰ) (ἄν), κε(ν)</i>	50 ²	36 ³	7	6	..	I	..	5	I	..	106
<i>ὅς(τις)</i>	2	30	..	3	I	2	8	11	57
<i>(ὅπ)δτε</i>	I	12	..	3	I	20	19	56
<i>ἐπεὶ</i>	..	3	I	I	3	8
<i>ὁσσάκις</i>	3	..	3
<i>ὅσος</i>	..	I	I
<i>ὅππότερος</i>	I	I
<i>ὅποῖος</i>	2	2
<i>ὅθι</i>	I	I
<i>ὅπη</i>	I	I
<i>ὅπως</i>	I	I
Totals.	54	82	7	12	I	I	0	9	33	38	237
	136 = 57.5%		19		2		9		71 = 30%		

¹ See page 9.

² Besides eight instances of ὅς εἰ with the opt., viz.: B 780; A 389, 467; X 410; ε 314; κ 415, 419; ρ 366.

³ Including ε 483, see page 108.

II.

SUBJUNCTIVE IN CONDITIONAL (RELATIVE) SENTENCES IN HOMER.

Protasis introduced by	Apodosis Future Ind.		Apodosis Imperative.		Apodosis Subjunctive.		Apodosis Optative.		Apodosis Present Indic. = Future.		Apodosis Present Indic. 'general cond.'		Totals.
	Pre-pos.	Post-pos.	Pre-pos.	Post-pos.	Pre-pos.	Post-pos.	Pre-pos.	Post-pos.	Pre-pos.	Post-pos.	Pre-pos.	Post-pos.	
εἰ, εἰ κε, etc.	40	43	24	4	8	1 ¹	7 ²	6 ³	18 ⁴	12	11	9 ⁵	183
ὅς(τις)	8	35	11	20	2 ¹	4 ⁸	1	6	2	64 ⁷	153
(ὅπ) ὅτε	4	18	11	7	1 ⁸	1	3 ⁹	5	42 ¹⁰	92
ἐπεὶ	11	14	16	4	..	1 ¹¹	1 ¹²	2	3	17	69
εὐτε	..	2	..	1	1	5	9
ἦμος	1	..	1
ὅφρα	1	6	3	4	5	19
εἰς ὃ κε	..	1 ¹³	1
πρίν	..	3 ¹⁴	..	3	2 ¹⁵	8
ὥς	10	1	11
ὅπ(π)ως	3	3
ὅππόσσε	..	1	1
ὀππότερος	1	..	2	3
ὅσσος	1	..	2	..	3
ὅπ(π)ῃ	1 ¹⁶	1	1 ¹⁷	3
ἥ	1 ¹⁸	1
ὀπποῖος	1 ¹⁹	1
οἶος	1	..	1
ὅθι	1	..	1
Totals.	65	123	77	44	8	2	11	13	20	26	24	150	563
	188 = 33·5 %		121 = 21 %		10		24		46		174 = 31 %		

¹ δ 391 (κε εἰπησι).² E 212 (τάμοι; I 362 (κε—ἰκοίμην), etc.³ Pot.-opt.⁴ Including I 412, 414 (ῶλετο).⁵ Including ε 119 (ἦν τις, v.l. ἦ τις); in ε 34 the best Mss. have *valei* (G. *vaîḡ*).⁶ N 232 (wish); Ξ 126 (ἀν opt.); 190 (πίθοιο); γ 320 ἔλποιο γε (Nauck-Cauer cj. κε).⁷ Including Φ 484 (ἔδωκε).⁸ δ 649 (τί κεν βέξειε;).⁹ Z 224, κ 508, π 71. Ω 369 is doubtful.¹⁰ Including ω 87.¹¹ K 63 (θέω, subj. dubit. = future).¹² Π 246 (wish).¹³ K 89 ἐνέγκε πόνοισι, εἰς δ κ' ἀντμῇ . . . μένη 'has decreed that I should be' = future, see Am.-H.¹⁴ β 374 (πρίν γ' ὅτ' ἄν); πρίν κ 175; ρ 9.¹⁵ δ 474; ν 336.¹⁶ ο 452 (κε . . . δλοιοι, δπη).¹⁷ θ 45.¹⁸ O 45.¹⁹ T 250 ὀπποῖον κ' εἴπησθα ἔπος, τοῖον κ' ἐπακούσαις = pres. general.

Conditional clauses dependent upon and assimilated in form to other dependent clauses (*e.g.* final, etc.) have been omitted. A few cases of aposiopesis might be mentioned; viz.: A 580; Φ 556, 567; X 111; ζ 262; ψ 319.

Besides the clauses included in this table, I have counted twenty-nine instances of the subjunctive in relative clauses in comparisons; see *G.M.T.* § 549.

We might add also the subjunctive in comparisons after *ὥς ὅτε*, etc.; see *G.M.T.*, p. 210, footnote.

II.

We are now in a position to consider the use of the optative in generic conditional (relative)¹ sentences in Greek: its beginning and its extension, and the relation of this so-called iterative optative to the corresponding generic subjunctive. We shall first present and discuss certain differences in form and in meaning between past and present generic conditions in Greek. Brugmann's statement, quoted above, p. 104, that the iterative optative originated in sentences like (χ 315) ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους παύεσκον μνηστῆρας ὅτις τοιαῦτά γε ῥέζοι, may serve us as a convenient point of departure. For two reasons, however, this example is not adequately representative of the beginning of the use of the optative in past generic sentences. For in the first place, its subordinate clause is introduced by the relative pronoun ὅστις, whereas the iterative optative appears to have been employed first in temporal clauses. This is shown by Tables I. and II. (pp. 114-115), from which we obtain the following statement (A):

Protasis introduced by	in (α) { Past general cond.	(3) { All other opt. cond.	(γ) { Present general cond.	(δ) { All other subj. cond.
εἰ	1	105	20 = 11 %	163
ὅς(τις)	19 = 27 %	38	66 = 38 %	87
Temp. conj. .	46 = 65 %	21	79 = 45 %	112
Other words .	5	2	9	37
Totals . . .	71	166	174	389

¹ Including, of course, temporal and all other clauses, in which the iterative optative occurs. To avoid the repetition of so clumsy an expression, we shall at times use the abbreviated forms 'generic cond. sentences,' 'generic periods,' etc., in the same sense.

Thus it appears that out of a total of 71 past generic conditional (relative) sentences in Homer, having the optative mood, only 19 (or 27 %) are introduced by the relative pronoun $\delta\varsigma(\tau\iota\varsigma)$, while temporal conjunctions introduce 46 (or 65 %); whereas for all other optative conditional (relative) sentences the corresponding figures are for $\delta\varsigma(\tau\iota\varsigma)$ 38 or (23 %) and for temporal conjunctions 21 (or 13 %). Compared absolutely the proportions are :

Temp. conj.	46 : 21 = 2 : 1
$\delta\varsigma(\tau\iota\varsigma)$	19 : 38 = 1 : 2

These facts are in keeping with the temporal character of the past general period, which has been probably universally recognized.¹

The direction of extension of the iterative optative was from temporal to conditional clauses introduced by $\epsilon\iota$, of which the beginning appears as early as in Homer. Relative ($\delta\varsigma(\tau\iota\varsigma)$) clauses occupy in Homer a middle ground, forming about one-fourth both of the past generic and of all other optative conditional (relative) clauses.²

A period, therefore, whose subordinate member was introduced by $\delta\tau\epsilon$ or $\acute{o}\pi\acute{o}\tau\epsilon$, would have indicated more accurately the beginning of the use of the iterative optative, than that selected by Brugmann.

But Table A (p. 116) not only proves that the iterative optative originated in temporal clauses. It shows a marked contrast between past general and present general conditions, in respect of the character of the protasis. For while some two-thirds of the past generic conditions are introduced by temporal conjunctions and only twenty-seven per cent by

¹ Some grammarians (e.g., Matthiae, § 524, 5) have even termed $\epsilon\iota$ in these clauses a kind of particle of time. If $\epsilon\iota$ was originally temporal, which seems improbable (see Brugmann, *Gr. Gram.*³ § 594, 1), the figures given above prove that in the language of Homer, it possessed no temporal connotation.

² In later Greek, however, the use of the relative pronoun in either of these constructions becomes, with certain exceptions (e.g., in Thucydides), unimportant. The strictly hypothetical periods are introduced almost exclusively by $\epsilon\iota$; while, on the other hand, the past general condition, though by certain writers $\epsilon\iota$ is here frequently employed, preserves throughout to a significant degree its temporal character. The past-Homeric history of this construction is shown in part by the

$\delta\varsigma(\tau\iota\varsigma)$, of the present general conditions only forty-five per cent are introduced by temporal conjunctions, whereas thirty-eight per cent have $\delta\varsigma(\tau\iota\varsigma)$ and eleven per cent, $\epsilon\iota$. That is to say, the proportion of clauses introduced by $\delta\varsigma(\tau\iota\varsigma)$ and $\epsilon\iota$ in present general conditions in Homer is almost twice what it is in past generic periods—forty-nine per cent in the former, twenty-seven per cent in the latter. In contrast with this the proportion of temporal clauses decreases from sixty-five to forty-five per cent. Again, sixty-eight per cent of all instances of temporal conjunctions followed by the optative occur in the past generic periods, while only forty-one per cent of these conjunctions followed by the subjunctive appear in the present

following table, for whose various items, however, absolute completeness is not claimed :

	$\epsilon\iota$		$\delta\varsigma(\tau\iota\varsigma)$		Temp. conj.		Other conj.		Sub-totals.		Totals.
	Past gen. cond.	Other opt. cond.	Past gen. cond.	Other opt. cond.	Past gen.	Other cond.	Past gen.	Other cond.	Past gen.	Other cond.	
Homer	1	105	19	38	46	22	5	2	71	167	238
Homeric Hymns and Hesiod	1	11 (12)	4 (5)	2 (3)	8		1	1	14	14	28
Pindar		9 (10)		1				1		11	11
Aeschylus	1	20	1			2		1	2	23	25
Sophocles	2	41	1	3		2	3	1	6	47	53
Euripides	17	63	3	2	3	1	2		25	66	91
Aristophanes	15	58	4	5	9			1	28	64	92
Herodotus	8	31	3	2	56		10		77	33	110
Thucydides	29	73	15	1	31	1	29	1	104	76	180
Sub-totals	74	411	50	54	153	28	50	8	327	501	828
Totals	485		104		181		58		828		

general conditions. For $\delta s(\tau\iota s)$ the corresponding figures are thirty-eight per cent and forty-three per cent. Thus in general cond. (rel.) sentences with the subjunctive, in Homer, as compared with those that have the optative, the proportion of clauses introduced by $\delta s(\tau\iota s)$ and $\epsilon\iota$ rises; of those with temporal conjunctions, falls.

But for a second reason, χ 315 does not adequately represent the past generic conditional (relative) sentence as found in Homer. For an examination of Tables I and II (pages 114-115) reveals the striking and doubtless significant fact that in this class of sentences in Homer the subordinate clause shows a remarkable tendency to precede its principal clause in its place in the sentence. In this respect, indeed, this class of conditional (rel.) periods differs from (with one exception¹) all other hypothetical sentences in Homer that have the subjunctive and the optative. Thus if we let the figures that precede the sign of ratio represent the prepositive protasis clauses, those that follow this symbol, the postpositive, we may state the facts concisely as follows:

Protasis introduced by	in (a) { Past gen.	(β) { All other opt. cond.	(γ) { Pres. gen.	(δ) { All other subj. cond.
$\delta s(\tau\iota s)$ ² . . .	8 : 11	3 : 35	2 : 64	22 : 65 ³
Temp. conj. . .	24 : 22	1 : 20	10 : 69	48 : 64 ³
All words . . .	33 : 38	62 : 104	24 : 150	181 : 208
All words except } $\epsilon\iota, \xi\alpha\nu$. . .	32 : 38	5 : 56	13 : 141	84 : 142

¹ Those that have an imperative in the conclusion, see Table II.

² Clauses with $\epsilon\iota$ should, of course, be excluded for the reason that $\epsilon\iota$ introduces both prepositive and postpositive clauses with approximate equality. In post-Homeric Greek, accordingly, when the use of $\delta s(\tau\iota s)$ and of temp. conjunctions with the optative becomes comparatively rare, except in generic suppositions, there is not so striking a difference between these classes of conditional periods. But even here the protasis in past general conditions usually precedes its apodosis, as is shown by the following table for Thucydides and Herodotus:

	Thuc. Pre. Post.	Hdt. Pre. Post.
$\epsilon\iota$	20 : 9	7 : 1
$\delta s(\tau\iota s)$	10 : 5	2 : 1
Temp. conj.	22 : 9	50 : 6
Other conj.	18 : 11	4 : 6
Totals	70 : 34	63 : 14

³ Omitting those which have an imperative in the apodosis, for $\delta s(\tau\iota s)$ 11 : 46, for temp. conj. 18 : 45.

Or, to state the matter in a different form, the number of past general (rel.) sentences in Homer, in which the protasis precedes its principal clause is almost equal to the number of those whose subordinate clause is postpositive (33 : 38), whereas for all other optative conditional (rel.) periods the corresponding figures are 63 : 104, or, omitting those conditions which are introduced by *εἰ*, 5 : 55 = 1 : 11.¹ The contrast is greatest in the case of the sentences introduced by temporal conjunctions (24 : 22 as contrasted with 1 : 20), and if the iterative optative was first used in this class of sentences, it seems fair to conclude that such an example as Γ 216 :

ἀλλ' ὅτε δὴ πολέμητις ἀναΐξειεν Ὀδυσσεύς, | στάσκειν . . .

would more perfectly represent the origin of this construction than χ 315.

Of great significance, too, is the contrast between the past and the present general conditional (rel.) sentences in respect of the ratio of prepositive to postpositive protasis clauses. In the former the ratio is 33 : 38; of the latter, less than one-seventh have the protasis preceding (24 : 150). Confining our attention to clauses introduced by *ὅς(τις)*, the corresponding figures are 8 (= 42 %) : 11, as contrasted with 2 : 64. Again, of the past general temporal clauses more than one-half are prepositive (24 : 22), of the present general only one-eighth (10 : 69).

Similar striking differences appear if we compare the past general sentences, that have the iterative optative, with all the other optative and subjunctive conditional (relative) periods.

The explanation of these two differences in form between these two classes of generic periods seems not far to seek. They arise from the fundamental distinction between all past and most present general conditional (relative) sentences. For the former always refer to action which is strictly iterative.² They imply occurrence or repetition of an act in the

¹ In the majority of these 56 instances the optative is due apparently to assimilation to a preceding optative.

² Due, of course, in large part to the tense of the verb of the apodosis.

experience of a certain designated individual or definitely limited group of individuals.¹ That is, they are always *abstract-concrete*,² and always retain a temporal coloring even when not introduced by conjunctions of time.

But of present general conditional (relative) periods only a portion refer to strictly iterative action, in the sense just stated. The larger number,³ at least in Homer, state rather a general truth, based indeed upon experience, but of universal application. They are *abstract*,⁴ not abstract-concrete; and though, like the former, these, too, imply the occurrence of the action of the protasis and so of the whole,⁵ this implication is somewhat obscured, owing to the absence in these sentences of time-distinction.

While, therefore, to the past generic periods conjunctions that express temporal relations seem the better adapted; to the present general sentences, which are not so clearly temporal either in origin or character, the words *εἰ* and *ὅς(τις)*.

The same fundamental distinction between all past and most present general periods probably accounts also for the contrast between these classes of conditional (relative) sentences, in respect of the order of their clauses. In the case of the former the clauses that contain the iterative optative show a remarkable tendency to precede their principal clauses, thus presenting first the circumstances that condition the action of the leading verb, and preserving both the logical and the chronological order of the events. In contrast with these,⁶ the present general period is usually, in form, a simple state-

¹ Thus in Homer, in 68 out of the 71 instances where the iterative optative occurs, the experience is stated to be that of a designated individual (or of several individuals): *e.g.*, Φ 265 (Achilles), γ 76 (Odysseus), etc. In only three instances is the person concerned somewhat indefinite, viz., Σ 544, 566, ploughers and harvesters (shield of Achilles), I 524, ancient warriors.

² For the meaning of this term see Paul, *Principien*², §§ 99, 174, 460, 503.

³ About two-thirds in Homer.

⁴ See Paul, *loc. cit.*

⁵ In this respect all general conditions differ from purely hypothetical statements.

⁶ There appears to be, however, in Homer a slight tendency even on the part of protasis clauses of the subjunctive conditions of strictly iterative action to precede the main clause.

ment of fact, to which is added a limiting clause, defining the circumstances under which the customary action takes place, or expressing a condition which gives to the whole the force of an universal truth. In the latter case, the subordinate clause is only an expanded adjective.

Thus there are in Greek certain marked differences in form between past and present generic periods, which we have tried to show are due to a fundamental distinction between all past and some present general conditions, on the one hand, and most present generic periods, on the other. It now remains to consider the assumption that the optative in these past conditions is the representative, after a past tense, of an original subjunctive (see p. 102). We may begin by calling attention to a corollary of the distinction pointed out above, that all past general conditional sentences express iterative action, whereas most present generic conditions are statements merely of an universal truth. This corollary is that the conditions of the latter class, whether used with specific reference to the present, past, or future, remain unchanged in form. For the present in such sentences "fulfils the function of an absolute tense."¹ To such present generic periods, therefore, as

Ο 207 ἐσθλὸν καὶ τὸ τέτυκται, ὅτ' ἄγγελος αἶσιμα εἰδῆ,

Α 218 ὅς κε θεοῖς ἐπιπείθεται, μάλα τ' ἔκλυον αὐτοῦ,

there can be no corresponding form in past time. An attempted transference to the past would immediately alter the character of the statement. The reference to the past would of itself destroy the universality of its application.² Hence the larger number — about two-thirds in Homer — of present generic conditional (relative) sentences, that have the subjunctive mood, have no corresponding form in past time.

¹ Paul, *Principien der Sprachgeschichte*³, § 459 (Engl. trans.).

² "Das Praeteritum bedeutet psychologisch ein Plus, eine Beziehung auf den Sprechenden; logisch ein Minus, indem es ein individuelles Erlebnis und keine allgemeine Behauptung enthält. Sowie letzteres der Fall ist, nimmt das Urtheil die Form des zeitlosen Praesens an," u.s.w. W. Jerusalem, *Urtheilsfunction* (1895), S. 133.

They admit of no change to the past. This fact alone casts suspicion upon the validity of the theory under discussion.

But proof that the assumption is entirely without support, in the case of the other sentences also, lies in the fact that in these past generic periods the subordinate clause is, without exception, logically prior or antecedent¹ to the leading clause. This antecedence is strongly emphasized, too, in these sentences by the tendency (noted above) of the protasis clause to precede its apodosis, whereas in all clear cases in Homer of the use of the optative as the representative of the subjunctive in *oratio obliqua* the optative occurs in a post-positive clause, as after *ὥς*, *ἵνα*, *μή*, etc., and in so-called objective conditions. There is, therefore, no justification for linking such logically prior or antecedent clauses with those that are posterior or subsecutive, which, because they not only "complete the judgment begun in the superior clause, but also mark some act of feeling, perception, or declaration, or some effort of intention on the part of its subject,"² admit such a change of mood when following an historic tense. For that the Greeks themselves clearly observed this distinction is shown by two facts. First, by the fact that in past general conditional clauses the double construction of optative or subjunctive—so common in *oratio obliqua*—was never admitted.³ And that this was no mere caprice of language becomes at once evident, when one finds many sentences like Ξ 163 f., and *Thuc.* VII, 59, *καὶ τὰλλα, ἣν ἔτι ναυμαχεῖν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι πολυμήσωσι, παρεσκευάζοντο . . .*; sentences in which the subordinate clause assumes a subjunctive force, and therefore allows either the subjunctive or the optative after a past tense, after the manner of final (*ἵνα*, *ὅπως*, etc.) clauses, and clauses in indirect discourse.

In the second place, this is shown by the fact that the optative frequently follows a verb of primary tense, not only in logically subsecutive (final), but also in antecedent (conditional) clauses. Thus in

¹ For these terms see Delbrück, *S.F.* I, p. 101; Lange, *Partikel* *et*, p. 18.

² Flagg, *op. cit.*, § 68.

³ *Ibid.*, p. ix.

β 350

(οἶνον) ὄν σὺ φυλάσσεις
 κεῖνον διομένη τὸν κάμμορον, εἴ ποθεν ἔλθοι,

the words εἴ ποθεν ἔλθοι express a wish, as originally conceived in the mind of Eurycleia, who longs for the return of her master; and the optative, ἔλθοι, is employed regardless of the mood or the tense of φυλάσσεις.¹ Now, if an original optative may appear in these subsecutive conditional clauses in connection with a *primary* tense, evidently the optative in such subsecutive conditional clauses may be original, even when following a *secondary* tense,² as in δ 317, ἤλυθον, εἴ τινά μοι κληιδόνα πατρός ἐνίσποις. But if this is a possibility in the case of subsecutive clauses, it ought to be a *probability* in the case of clauses of pure condition which express a merely limiting circumstance. And that this is a probability, not to say a certainty, is shown by the occurrence of the optative in such antecedent clauses grammatically dependent upon a verb of *primary* time, as in α 413:

οὗτ' οὖν ἀγγελίης ἔτι πείθομαι, εἴ ποθεν ἔλθοι . . . ,

in which εἴ ποθεν ἔλθοι, though postpositive, is logically antecedent, and the optative, used without any thought of sequence, describes a purely imaginary case.³ Other similar passages are ω 253, 341, Aesch. *Ag.* 1042 (ἐπιρρέποι, Flor.), *Thuc.* I, 52, 2, etc.

The evidence of such passages militates against the theory that "the optative in past general suppositions only represents the corresponding subjunctive transferred to the past" (*G.M.T.*, p. 389).⁴ Like the optative of *oratio obliqua*, it was

¹ A similar passage is υ 224 f., with which we may compare α 114 f., Aesch. *Pers.* 523 ff. (Weil), and many other passages.

² Lange, *op. cit.*, p. 88 f.

³ See also Lange's comment, *op. cit.*, p. 140 f.

⁴ A further argument against the theory is afforded by the fact that, whereas such a sentence as 'I came that I might see' implies an "original" 'I am coming or going that I *may* see,' a past generic period, as 'Whenever I met him, I struck him,' does not rest upon or imply the corresponding form 'Whenever I meet him, I strike him.' There is a fundamental difference between these two classes of sentences.

in origin a Greek construction,¹ and was apparently an extension at first to temporal clauses — and that without any notion of sequence of moods or of a change of mood — of a mood already freely employed in ordinary conditional clauses.² It is beside our purpose to discuss the question why the Greek, as contrasted with other languages, employed the optative and the subjunctive, instead of the indicative, in general conditions. But why the Greeks used the optative in past generic periods in contrast with the subjunctive in present general conditions³ may probably be explained in the words of Monro, not written, however, with specific reference to this construction: "If the occasion to which the whole sentence refers is *past*, or is a mere *possibility*, or an *imaginary* case, these two meanings of the Subjunctive [expressing will or expectation] are generally out of place, and we can only have the Mood which expresses a wish, or an admission of possibility."⁴

Instead, therefore, of calling the iterative optative the representative, by a change of mood, of the subjunctive in generic periods, let us say rather that the adaptability of the optative to use with past tenses, which is suggested by its secondary personal endings, and is illustrated by the optative in past general conditions, was the starting-point and ground of its use in *oratio obliqua*. And perhaps this is all that Brugmann means (see page 104). If so, his statement of the connection between these constructions is certainly obscure and misleading.

In conclusion, we may note incidentally that in view of the fact that one of the prominent features of Professor Goodwin's classification of conditional sentences was the attempt "to carry out the analogy between these [cond. sent.] and conditional relative sentences more completely," by which arrangement only "the true nature of analogous relative sen-

¹ Brugmann, *Gr. Gram.*² § 562.

² Probably the potential optative, see Brugmann, *Gr. Gram.*³ § 562.

³ In origin the volitive subjunctive, according to Professor Hale, 'Subjunctive and Optative Conditions in Greek and Latin,' *Harvard Studies*, xii (1901), p. 111, footnote 2.

⁴ *Hom. Gram.*² § 301, see also Lange, *op. cit.*, p. 140 f.

tences can be made clear,"¹ his statements, that the use of the optative and the subjunctive in general conditions are constructions which are still undeveloped in Homer, "except in relative clauses,"² are particularly unfortunate.

In Homer there are seventy-one past general (relative) conditions, equal to thirty per cent of all the optative conditions, and one hundred and seventy-four present generic conditions, equal to thirty-one per cent of all conditional (relative) sentences having the subjunctive in the protasis.³ Certainly no justification can be offered for the exclusion of such widespread constructions. And we may add, these same general conditions, with the subjunctive and the optative, the recognition of which, as we have seen, was an important step in the development of Professor Goodwin's doctrine of the Greek moods, but which, divorced from other subjunctive and optative conditions, were summarily and without good reason thrust to one side and ignored as being late-born constructions, thus stubbornly return to assert their right to a more adequate and fair treatment.⁴

It may be, therefore, that "the whole supposed necessity for any definition at all except that of time" (see p. 102) is, after all, not a matter of the imagination merely.⁵

¹ *M. & T.*² (1865), p. iv.; see also *J.Ph.* V (1874), pp. 192, 201, and *M. & T.*⁵ (1873), Preface.

² *G.M.T.* (1889), §§ 11, b; 17.

³ To these should be added the large number of cases of the subjunctive in comparisons.

⁴ Professor Goodwin's remark (*M.T.* (1889), § 11, b) that "the subjunctive in general suppositions is the only one which does not refer to future time, . . . the Greek in its desire to avoid a form denoting present time generally fell into one which it uses elsewhere only for future time," reminds one strongly of the same writer's words, published fifteen years before, in criticism of Kühner's theory, "where he says that the subjunctive properly refers to future time, although sometimes in dependent clauses *it seems* to refer to present time, really, however, expressing what is 'assumed as present.' It is almost needless to say that the examples of this singular exception are found in the general conditional sentences above mentioned" (*J.Ph.* V (1874), p. 193). It is interesting and instructive to note that the same construction was for each the "*λίθος προσκόμματος και πέτρα σκανδάλου*."

⁵ See also Hale, *Harvard Studies*, XII, p. 111.